Why Middle Power Coalition Strategies Fail Against Great Powers

This article critically examines the limitations of middle power coalition strategies in countering great power influence, particularly in the context of U.S. economic nationalism and China’s strategic assertiveness. Drawing on historical and contemporary examples—including the Cairns Group, MIKTA, and the proposed JACK coalition (Japan, Australia, Canada, South Korea)—the authors argue that structural asymmetries, economic dependencies, and strategic defection undermine the viability of sustained middle power cooperation. The failure of coordinated responses to U.S. tariff threats illustrates the prisoner’s dilemma dynamics that incentivize individual accommodation over collective resistance. The article contends that middle powers must abandon idealistic coalition-building in favor of pragmatic, issue-specific cooperation and deeper integration within existing alliance structures. By aligning with hegemonic frameworks while negotiating implementation details, middle powers can preserve strategic relevance without directly challenging dominant powers. This approach offers a more realistic pathway for maintaining liberal international order and managing great power competition.