The trouble with truth-makers

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12 Citations (Scopus)


This paper argues that theories of truth which seek to specify the ontological ground of true statements by appealing to an ontology of truth-makers face a severe and possibly insurmountable obstacle in the form of logically complex statements, I argue that there is no apparent way to develop an account of logically complex truth within the confines of a modest and plausible ontology of truth-makers and to this end criticize independent attempts by Armstrong and Pendlebury to develop such an account.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)45-62
Number of pages18
JournalPacific Philosophical Quarterly
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - Mar 1997
Externally publishedYes


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