The language of data privacy law (and how it differs from reality)

Christopher Kuner, Dan Jerker B Svantesson, Fred H Cate, Orla Lynskey, Christopher Millard

Research output: Contribution to journalEditorialResearch

Abstract

Legal language often contains vague, general wording that actually means very little unless read in a specific context. But legal language also includes clear absolute statements from which no variation seems possible. This is the case when one examines data privacy law. Where used appropriately, the first type—the vague, general wording—is commonly found as expressions of principles that require a flexible interpretation. The focus on concepts such as ‘adequacy’ and ‘proportionality’ are clear examples of this. The second type—the clear absolute statements—are often (appropriately) found as expressions of fundamental rights. Both types of wording may, however, be problematic, as can be seen from the example of European Union (EU) data protection law.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)259-260
Number of pages2
JournalInternational Data Privacy Law
Volume6
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2016

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privacy law
data protection
proportionality
fundamental right
language
interpretation
Law

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Kuner, Christopher ; Svantesson, Dan Jerker B ; Cate, Fred H ; Lynskey, Orla ; Millard, Christopher. / The language of data privacy law (and how it differs from reality). In: International Data Privacy Law. 2016 ; Vol. 6, No. 4. pp. 259-260.
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The language of data privacy law (and how it differs from reality). / Kuner, Christopher; Svantesson, Dan Jerker B; Cate, Fred H; Lynskey, Orla; Millard, Christopher.

In: International Data Privacy Law, Vol. 6, No. 4, 2016, p. 259-260.

Research output: Contribution to journalEditorialResearch

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