Tendering theory revisited

Göran Runeson*, Martin Skitmore

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

64 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper discusses the content, origin and development of tendering theory as a theory of price determination. It demonstrates how tendering theory determines prices and how it is different from game and decision theories, and that in the tendering process, with non-cooperative, simultaneous, single sealed bids with individual private valuations, extensive public information, a large number of bidders and a long sequence of tendering occasions, mere develops a competitive equilibrium. The development of a competitive equilibrium means that the concept of the tender as the sum of a valuation and a strategy, which is at the core of tendering theory, cannot be supported, and that there are serious empirical, theoretical and methodological inconsistencies in the theory.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)285-296
Number of pages12
JournalConstruction Management and Economics
Volume17
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1999
Externally publishedYes

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