Abstract
This paper discusses the content, origin and development of tendering theory as a theory of price determination. It demonstrates how tendering theory determines prices and how it is different from game and decision theories, and that in the tendering process, with non-cooperative, simultaneous, single sealed bids with individual private valuations, extensive public information, a large number of bidders and a long sequence of tendering occasions, mere develops a competitive equilibrium. The development of a competitive equilibrium means that the concept of the tender as the sum of a valuation and a strategy, which is at the core of tendering theory, cannot be supported, and that there are serious empirical, theoretical and methodological inconsistencies in the theory.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 285-296 |
Number of pages | 12 |
Journal | Construction Management and Economics |
Volume | 17 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1999 |
Externally published | Yes |