TY - JOUR
T1 - Standard Deviation of Bids for Construction Contract Auctions
AU - Ballesteros-Pérez, Pablo
AU - Skitmore, Martin
AU - Cerezo-Narváez, Alberto
AU - González-Cruz, Mª Carmen
AU - Pastor-Fernández, Andrés
AU - Otero-Mateo, Manuel
PY - 2021/8/1
Y1 - 2021/8/1
N2 - Previous research has confirmed that the distribution of bids for construction auctions can be reasonably modeled with Lognormal distribution. The location parameter of this distribution (the mean μ) has been found to have a good linear correlation with the bidders' cost estimates. However, the scale parameter (standard deviation of the bids, σ) remains noticeably difficult to anticipate. By analyzing 13 construction auction datasets, hard evidence is provided that the high variability of σ observed in construction auctions is mostly due to sample size (number of bids per auction). Moreover, we show that the coefficient of variation (σ/μ) of log-transformed bids follows the same χ2 distribution in uncapped auctions. This means the σ′s population value in similar auctions is nearly proportional to μ provided the bid price is not upper limited. Other findings are that more frequent bidders do not tend to bid lower, but their dispersion is narrower than sporadic bidders. These findings allow the introduction of important simplifications in construction bidding models, especially when access to historical data is limited.
AB - Previous research has confirmed that the distribution of bids for construction auctions can be reasonably modeled with Lognormal distribution. The location parameter of this distribution (the mean μ) has been found to have a good linear correlation with the bidders' cost estimates. However, the scale parameter (standard deviation of the bids, σ) remains noticeably difficult to anticipate. By analyzing 13 construction auction datasets, hard evidence is provided that the high variability of σ observed in construction auctions is mostly due to sample size (number of bids per auction). Moreover, we show that the coefficient of variation (σ/μ) of log-transformed bids follows the same χ2 distribution in uncapped auctions. This means the σ′s population value in similar auctions is nearly proportional to μ provided the bid price is not upper limited. Other findings are that more frequent bidders do not tend to bid lower, but their dispersion is narrower than sporadic bidders. These findings allow the introduction of important simplifications in construction bidding models, especially when access to historical data is limited.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85108025342&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0002118
DO - 10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0002118
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85108025342
SN - 0733-9364
VL - 147
JO - Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
JF - Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
IS - 8
M1 - 04021096
ER -