Remuneration committees, shareholder dissent on CEO pay and the CEO pay–performance link

Pamela Kent, Kim Kercher, James Routledge

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

16 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We provide evidence on whether the adoption of the full Australian Securities Exchange recommendations for remuneration committee formation and structure are associated with a lower shareholder dissenting vote or a stronger CEO pay–performance link. We find some evidence that a minority- and majority-independent remuneration committee and a committee size of at least the recommended three members are associated with lower shareholder dissent. Companies with an independent committee have a stronger CEO pay–performance link. In addition, a majority-independent committee strengthens the link between performance and growth in CEO pay.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)445-475
Number of pages31
JournalAccounting and Finance
Volume58
Issue number2
Early online date25 Jul 2016
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2018

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Remuneration committees, shareholder dissent on CEO pay and the CEO pay–performance link'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this