Abstract
The Right to Enjoy the Benefit of Scientific Progress and its Applications (RBSP) is established under Article 15(b) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), in effect from 1976. Overshadowed by other provisions within the ICESCR, the RBSP has received less scholarly attention than other human rights, leading to under-theorisation of its scope and application. Current international tensions regarding global responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, including the limited utility of the TRIPS waivers in the context of vaccine patents, vaccine nationalism and other health inequities revealed during the pandemic, nonetheless reveal the importance of the RBSP.
In contrast, increasing geopolitical tensions, including the intensifying trade war between the United States and China, are leading to increased hardening of security positions in many states, and concerns regarding threats to national security and sovereign interests are frequently viewed as outweighing human rights considerations. Dual-use technologies with potential application in missile, nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons programs have traditionally been regulated via multinational non-proliferation regimes giving effect to international laws, including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and the Chemical Weapons Convention. States have adopted lists of technological inputs developed by the regimes as the basis for their own national export control programs. Increasingly, access to knowledge capable of contributing to WMD programs has become a target of state regulation, for example, through increasing scrutiny of scientists and scholars applying for visas to undertake research.
These approaches are increasingly being expanded by states to encompass other ‘critical’ or ‘sensitive’ technologies, deemed to be important for reasons which may relate to security, including economic interests. Unsurprisingly, these measures are encountering opposition from countries, led by China, who feel they are being targeted by the measures and excluded from pursuing the social and economic benefits that could flow from unrestricted access to peaceful application of the technologies, benefits that may be perceived as entitlements under the RBSP.
This chapter, in exploring the Australian critical technology migration law reforms as a case study, argues that the case for restriction of the RBSP through prevention of international students and experts obtaining knowledge of those technologies through postgraduate study/visits has not been adequately made as part of the Australian reforms. In demonstrating that, it highlights the need for states considering expansion of export restrictions and migration on the grounds of securing critical or sensitive technologies to be clear-sighted about their own national interests, as distinct from those of their allies, in an increasingly complex geopolitical environment. More specifically, in an era where bi- and multi-lateral security and technology transfer arrangements seem likely to become the norm, it highlights several salient matters that should be considered by states seeking to enact domestic laws to support their international agreements. These include ensuring that legitimate expectations about clarity and accountability in public administration are not overlooked; that the requirement to justify privileging national security over human rights is not disregarded; that the relevance of those interests to the state, rather than merely its partners, is clear and considered; and also, that the effect of asymmetry in international human rights obligations is considered. The RBSP is a salient example of an asymmetrical human right: while Australia has signed up to and ratified the ICESCR, the United States has not; any obligations it has under RBSP arise from different legal instruments, potentially with different normative content, and are owed to a much narrower constituency. States should be wary of sacrificing their own international obligations at the behest of an unfettered security partner, without adequately considering the consequences for their own domestic and international legitimacy.
In contrast, increasing geopolitical tensions, including the intensifying trade war between the United States and China, are leading to increased hardening of security positions in many states, and concerns regarding threats to national security and sovereign interests are frequently viewed as outweighing human rights considerations. Dual-use technologies with potential application in missile, nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons programs have traditionally been regulated via multinational non-proliferation regimes giving effect to international laws, including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and the Chemical Weapons Convention. States have adopted lists of technological inputs developed by the regimes as the basis for their own national export control programs. Increasingly, access to knowledge capable of contributing to WMD programs has become a target of state regulation, for example, through increasing scrutiny of scientists and scholars applying for visas to undertake research.
These approaches are increasingly being expanded by states to encompass other ‘critical’ or ‘sensitive’ technologies, deemed to be important for reasons which may relate to security, including economic interests. Unsurprisingly, these measures are encountering opposition from countries, led by China, who feel they are being targeted by the measures and excluded from pursuing the social and economic benefits that could flow from unrestricted access to peaceful application of the technologies, benefits that may be perceived as entitlements under the RBSP.
This chapter, in exploring the Australian critical technology migration law reforms as a case study, argues that the case for restriction of the RBSP through prevention of international students and experts obtaining knowledge of those technologies through postgraduate study/visits has not been adequately made as part of the Australian reforms. In demonstrating that, it highlights the need for states considering expansion of export restrictions and migration on the grounds of securing critical or sensitive technologies to be clear-sighted about their own national interests, as distinct from those of their allies, in an increasingly complex geopolitical environment. More specifically, in an era where bi- and multi-lateral security and technology transfer arrangements seem likely to become the norm, it highlights several salient matters that should be considered by states seeking to enact domestic laws to support their international agreements. These include ensuring that legitimate expectations about clarity and accountability in public administration are not overlooked; that the requirement to justify privileging national security over human rights is not disregarded; that the relevance of those interests to the state, rather than merely its partners, is clear and considered; and also, that the effect of asymmetry in international human rights obligations is considered. The RBSP is a salient example of an asymmetrical human right: while Australia has signed up to and ratified the ICESCR, the United States has not; any obligations it has under RBSP arise from different legal instruments, potentially with different normative content, and are owed to a much narrower constituency. States should be wary of sacrificing their own international obligations at the behest of an unfettered security partner, without adequately considering the consequences for their own domestic and international legitimacy.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | The Routledge International Handbook of Research Security |
| Editors | Brendan Walker-Munro, Tommy Shih |
| Publisher | Routledge |
| Chapter | 13 |
| Pages | 230-251 |
| Number of pages | 22 |
| Edition | 1 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9781040556214, 9781003583431 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9781032951591 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 15 Jun 2026 |
UN SDGs
This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
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SDG 3 Good Health and Well-being
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SDG 16 Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions
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