This piece is part of a two-part series regarding the application of the R2P doctrine in Yemen. The first part explored the concept of R2P and this second part concerns the specific application of this doctrine to Yemen.
A criticism of the R2P doctrine is that it is interventionism masked as humanitarian aid, which has, in the past, failed to achieve its objectives, particularly following the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (‘NATO’) intervention in Kosovo, which proceeded without UN authorisation [at p.287]. The main critique of the intervention in Kosovo is founded primarily on the targeting of dual military – civilian use facilities, in direct contravention of customary international humanitarian law [at p.271]. Aside from the nature of the intervention and the means of force used in Kosovo, the international community recognised a need for an ‘exception to the rule’, that is, intervention in times of emergency, which would traditionally be considered a violation of State sovereignty.
The 2011 military intervention in Libya is considered a failure of the R2P doctrine in its current form; the failures of Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo predate the current framework. The intervention lead to further destabilisation and affected the intensity of the conflict long-term. The mandated intention of the allied intervention by NATO was to achieve ‘immediate ceasefire, including an end to all current attacks against civilians by the Gaddafi regime and its supporters’. Despite initial successes, the campaign ultimately failed when the allied nations involved disagreed on which nations would control certain aspects of the campaign, like the no-fly zone. Ultimately, conflict in Libya substantially ended following the death of Muammar Gaddafi n October 2011, and the UNSC subsequently withdrew operations.
|Publication status||Published - 31 Aug 2020|