Abstract
[Extract]
In this paper I propose a version of metaphysical realism which I
believe to be resistent to a number of antirealist attacks - in particular the attacks of Hilary Putnam. In the first part of the paper I outline the position and describe a number of responses to obvious objections. In the second part I demonstrate how this version avoids the charges of incoherence laid against the realist by Putnam.
In this paper I propose a version of metaphysical realism which I
believe to be resistent to a number of antirealist attacks - in particular the attacks of Hilary Putnam. In the first part of the paper I outline the position and describe a number of responses to obvious objections. In the second part I demonstrate how this version avoids the charges of incoherence laid against the realist by Putnam.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 465-487 |
| Number of pages | 23 |
| Journal | Philosophia (United States) |
| Volume | 26 |
| Issue number | 3-4 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1998 |
| Externally published | Yes |