Abstract
A generalised bidding model is developed to calculate a bidder's expected profit and auctioners expected revenue/payment for both a General Independent Value and Independent Private Value (IPV) kmth price sealed-bid auction (where the mth bidder wins at the kth bid payment) using a linear (affine) mark-up function. The Common Value (CV) assumption, and highbid and lowbid symmetric and asymmetric First Price Auctions and Second Price Auctions are included as special cases. The optimal n bidder symmetric analytical results are then provided for the uniform IPV and CV models in equilibrium. Final comments concern implications, the assumptions involved and prospects for further research.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 1864-1875 |
Number of pages | 12 |
Journal | Journal of the Operational Research Society |
Volume | 65 |
Issue number | 12 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Jan 2014 |
Externally published | Yes |