Kmth price sealed-bid auctions with general independent values and equilibrium linear mark-ups

Martin Skitmore*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)
2 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

A generalised bidding model is developed to calculate a bidder's expected profit and auctioners expected revenue/payment for both a General Independent Value and Independent Private Value (IPV) kmth price sealed-bid auction (where the mth bidder wins at the kth bid payment) using a linear (affine) mark-up function. The Common Value (CV) assumption, and highbid and lowbid symmetric and asymmetric First Price Auctions and Second Price Auctions are included as special cases. The optimal n bidder symmetric analytical results are then provided for the uniform IPV and CV models in equilibrium. Final comments concern implications, the assumptions involved and prospects for further research.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1864-1875
Number of pages12
JournalJournal of the Operational Research Society
Volume65
Issue number12
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2014
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Kmth price sealed-bid auctions with general independent values and equilibrium linear mark-ups'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this