TY - JOUR
T1 - Conviction and punishment
T2 - Free press and competitive election as deterrents to corruption
AU - Tian, Xiaowen
AU - Io Lo, Vai
PY - 2009
Y1 - 2009
N2 - Democratic institutions are not equally effective in curbing corruption. Using a criminal behavior model, this study formulates the hypothesis that corruption offenders, being risk-inclined, are deterred more by conviction-reinforcing democratic institutions than by punishment-reinforcing democratic institutions. Evidence based on cross-country regressions strongly supports this hypothesis, indicating that compared with competitive election, free press is a more effective deterrent to corruption. While shedding light on why corruption remains rampant in some electoral democracies - particularly the illiberal democracies - this study identifies a key to corruption control.
AB - Democratic institutions are not equally effective in curbing corruption. Using a criminal behavior model, this study formulates the hypothesis that corruption offenders, being risk-inclined, are deterred more by conviction-reinforcing democratic institutions than by punishment-reinforcing democratic institutions. Evidence based on cross-country regressions strongly supports this hypothesis, indicating that compared with competitive election, free press is a more effective deterrent to corruption. While shedding light on why corruption remains rampant in some electoral democracies - particularly the illiberal democracies - this study identifies a key to corruption control.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=61549131927&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1080/14719030802685479
DO - 10.1080/14719030802685479
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:61549131927
SN - 1471-9037
VL - 11
SP - 155
EP - 172
JO - Public Management Review
JF - Public Management Review
IS - 2
ER -
