Conviction and punishment: Free press and competitive election as deterrents to corruption

Xiaowen Tian, Vai Io Lo

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Democratic institutions are not equally effective in curbing corruption. Using a criminal behavior model, this study formulates the hypothesis that corruption offenders, being risk-inclined, are deterred more by conviction-reinforcing democratic institutions than by punishment-reinforcing democratic institutions. Evidence based on cross-country regressions strongly supports this hypothesis, indicating that compared with competitive election, free press is a more effective deterrent to corruption. While shedding light on why corruption remains rampant in some electoral democracies - particularly the illiberal democracies - this study identifies a key to corruption control.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)155-172
Number of pages18
JournalPublic Management Review
Volume11
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2009

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Elections
Punishment
Corruption
Democratic institutions
Democracy
Cross-country regressions
Evidence-based

Cite this

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Conviction and punishment : Free press and competitive election as deterrents to corruption. / Tian, Xiaowen; Io Lo, Vai.

In: Public Management Review, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2009, p. 155-172.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

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