Competitive and Harmonized R & D Policies for International R & D Alliances involving Asymmetric Firms

Rod Falvey, Khemarat Talerngsri Teerasuwannajak

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We examine R&D policies when a national firm forms an R&D alliance with a foreign competitor. Firms differ in R&D capabilities, select among three forms of R&D alliance and adopt a profit-sharing rule if they coordinate their R&D decisions. When firms coordinate their R&D decisions and governments choose R&D policies independently, R&D taxes are chosen, but if governments harmonize their policies, they decide not to intervene. These policy outcomes affect the types of R&D alliance chosen. Agreements to share R&D information can outperform those with both coordination and sharing as a result of the R&D tax that coordination attracts.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)302-329
Number of pages28
JournalReview of International Economics
Volume24
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 May 2016

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firm
profit sharing
taxes
policy
tax
co-ordination
decision
profit

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Falvey, Rod ; Teerasuwannajak, Khemarat Talerngsri. / Competitive and Harmonized R & D Policies for International R & D Alliances involving Asymmetric Firms. In: Review of International Economics. 2016 ; Vol. 24, No. 2. pp. 302-329.
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Competitive and Harmonized R & D Policies for International R & D Alliances involving Asymmetric Firms. / Falvey, Rod; Teerasuwannajak, Khemarat Talerngsri.

In: Review of International Economics, Vol. 24, No. 2, 01.05.2016, p. 302-329.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

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