Compensation across executive labor markets: What can we learn from cross-listed firms?

Colette Southam, Stephen Sapp

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

14 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

There is wide consensus that chief executive officers (CEOs) of US firms earn significantly more than their Canadian counterparts. Using a matched sample, we find that the majority of this difference is due to US CEOs earning 50% more than CEOs of Canadian non-cross-listed firms. We find no such "US premium" for Canadian cross-listed firms, because the use of options allows the cross-listed firms to keep pace with their neighbors to the south. While firms that list only in Canada compete in the labor market defined by their national boundary, cross-listed firms appear to be competing directly with their US counterparts for executive talent. In investigating alternative explanations for the elimination of the compensation differential for Canadian cross-listed firms, we find evidence consistent with both the bonding and the rent extraction hypotheses. Journal of International Business Studies (2010) 41, 70-87. doi:10.1057/jibs.2009.34

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)70-87
Number of pages18
JournalJournal of International Business Studies
Volume41
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2010
Externally publishedYes

Cite this

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Compensation across executive labor markets: What can we learn from cross-listed firms? / Southam, Colette; Sapp, Stephen.

In: Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 41, No. 1, 01.2010, p. 70-87.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

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