China and the Strategic Evolution of the Belt and Road Initiative

The history of the old silk road dates from the second century BCE to the 15th century. Its modern manifestation dates from 2013 when China announced the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ and the ‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road’. These land and sea routes became known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Instead of silk, however, the prized ‘commodity’ from China became infrastructure and its associated connectivity. The BRI includes 150 countries and over 30 engaged institutions, is likely to draw in a total investment of circa $8 billion in coming decades, may boost global GDP by over $7.1 billion annually by 2040, and has numerous economic corridors across four continents with extensions into the Arctic and the Indo-Pacific. It has been touted by some as a major developmental driver of non-Western globalization, but also has been attacked as a strategic form of ‘geopolitical aggression’ used to promote China’s global leadership and influence. Beyond these simplistic assessments, the reality of the BRI is that it has been through a continuing strategic evolution since its first announcement in 2013. At first it was a generalized framework to ensure China’s access to resources and markets as part of its ‘going out’ into the global economy, designed to soak up excess production and support domestic job creation. It was thereafter modified several times in its policy emphasis. It was linked to China’s model ‘community of common destiny’ as shared development among partner states, and to the goal of creating an Ecological Civilization (from 2007) that would embed economic, social and environmental sustainability into the BRI, making it compatible with the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals. This was followed from 2015 onwards by an effort to channel green investment and circular economic models onto the BRI, rebranding it as a Green BRI (GBRI). Unfortunately, over the last decade this transition has been problematic, with only 28-34% of China’s BRI energy engagement being in green or hydropower projects, and with China’s ongoing inability to curtail coal usage despite its planned goal of ‘carbon neutrality’ before 2060. There has also been uneven monitoring of the long-term social and ecological outcomes of many BRI projects, leading to some controversial failures for its megaprojects. In the July 2024 Communique of the Third Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, China once again emphasized its commitment to green development, but noted that there would be some refinement of mechanisms to support high-quality development and cooperation. However, these goals can only be achieved by bottom-up processes of sustainable development linking local communities, indigenous knowledge, small businesses and engaged publics, ensuring that BRI projects are negotiated and structured to achieve these goals.