Agent-based theories of right action

Damian Cox*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

9 Citations (Scopus)
132 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

In this paper, I develop an objection to agent-based accounts of right action. Agent-based accounts of right action attempt to derive moral judgment of actions from judgment of the inner quality of virtuous agents and virtuous agency. A moral theory ought to be something that moral agents can permissibly use in moral deliberation. I argue for a principle that captures this intuition and show that, for a broad range of other-directed virtues and motives, agent-based accounts of right action fail to satisfy this principle.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)505-515
Number of pages11
JournalEthical Theory and Moral Practice
Volume9
Issue number5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2006

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