Abstract
This chapter critically evaluates the use of the so-called ‘rough sex defence’ in Australian rape cases. We argue that the ‘rough sex defence’ in this context is an example of ‘implied consent’, specifically in that it relies on evidence that the defendant and victim-survivor had engaged in (or had even simply discussed) ‘rough’ sexual activity on a previous occasion(s). This narrative of implied consent to rough sex is used to establish either of two things. The first is that the victim-survivor actually did consent to ‘rough’ sexual activity on the occasion in question. The second is that the defendant mistakenly believed in consent, since roughness had been a feature of previous sexual discussions or activities. We argue that the use of the rough sex defence in rape trials is problematic for at least two reasons. First, the defence allows defendants to rely upon false and harmful ‘rape myths’ to avoid accountability for their actions. Second, a reliance on the rough sex defence also contradicts moves to adopt an affirmative consent standard as part of Australian rape law. We conclude by recommending reforms to the legal framework that would help reduce the reliance on the argument that a rape allegation can be explained away as ‘rough sex gone wrong’.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | 'Rough Sex' and the Criminal Law: Global Perspectives |
Editors | Hannah Bows, Jonathan Herring |
Publisher | Emerald Group Publishing Limited |
Pages | 117-132 |
ISBN (Print) | 9781801179294 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 7 Nov 2022 |